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DISAPPEARING ACTS: How PARENSPATRIAE MAKES
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS VANISH
IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE
CHRISTOPHER WAY*
Citizen suit provisions are powerful tools in environmental
litigation. Essentially, they enable private "citizens [to act] as private
attorneys general,"' litigating on behalf of themselves and the general
public against those who violate environmental law. These provisions
allow citizens to bring actions under certain environmental statutes. For
example, the Clean Air Act ("CAA") 2 permits citizen-suits for injunctive
relief and civil penalties. 3 These penalties may include monetary damages
of up to $32,500 per day of violation.4 Under the CAA, "any person may"
file suit alleging violations of the CAA's emissions standards or orders
relating to emissions standards against any other person.5 After the plaintiff
has brought suit, however, the plaintiff's suit may be dismissed if the
government negotiates a settlement with the offender. When this happens,
the government becomes "parens patriae" and, consequently, res judicata
or collateral estoppel can bar the citizen-suit.7
Parens patriae provides the government with standing to sue on
behalf of its citizens,8 which takes priority over any suit brought privately
under a citizen suit provision even when the individual has already initiated
the private suit.9 This Comment will examine the reasons for this policy as
well as the implications of barring private suits brought under citizen suit
provisions. The first section describes a recent Louisiana decision
analyzing parens patriae and determining which method of application best
serves all interests involved. The second section discusses the implications
of that holding and its precedential value for other decisions based on
environmental statutes. The decision examined below makes no major
* Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2007-2009. B.S. 2006, University of Maryland; J.D. 2009, University of Kentucky College of
Law.
1 Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1052
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2008).
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2008).
St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 597 (E.D. La. 2007).
5id.
6 See, e.g., id. at 600-08.7id.
8 L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1982).
9 See generally, St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D. La.
2007).
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changes to the application of parens patriae in environmental suits. The
opinion's value comes from its analysis of the present doctrine and the
questions that the opinion creates for the future.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE
A. Procedural Background
On February 12, 2004, St. Bernard Citizens for Environmental
Quality Inc. ("St. Bernard") began a long saga of litigation as it sought
remedies for violations of the CAA.)0  St. Bernard is a non-profit
corporation organized to deal with various environmental issues in
Louisiana and the St. Bernard Parish. I" The group brought suit under the
citizen suit provision of the CAA and under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act.' 2 In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that
Chalmette Refining, L.L.C. ("Chalmette") "violated and continues to
violate (1) hourly permit emission limits for various harmful pollutants,
(2) flare performance standards and monitoring requirements, (3) benzene
emission limits for its storage tanks, (4) State reporting requirements for
'unauthorized discharges' of pollutants and (5) EPCRA reporting
requirements."' 3
St. Bernard filed for partial summary judgment on the issues of
Chalmette's liability for "34 violations of its emission permits" and
St. Bernard's standing to sue as its members suffered an injury traceable to
Chalmette's activities. 14 "[Tihe Court granted [St. Bemard's] first motion
for partial summary judgment" on February 3, 2005. 5 Two months later,
the plaintiffs filed a second motion for partial summary judgment
concerning 2,629 other alleged violations.1 6 After plaintiffs filed their
motion, however, Chalmette "entered an Administrative Consent Order
with the [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("LDEQ")].' 7
The Consent Order required Chalmette to "submit updated [CAA]
permit applications" and "operate its emission sources in compliance with
the interim emission limitations and monitoring and reporting
requirements" until LDEQ took a final action regarding the updated
10 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d






16 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 595 (E.D. La. 2007)..
"I d. at 596
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applications.' 8 In October of that year, the court granted the second motion
of partial summary judgment but did not award injunctive relief due to
Hurricane Katrina. 9 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana found that the damage Katrina wrought could change
the legal and equitable considerations for determining whether injunctive
relief was appropriate and ordered additional briefing. St. Bernard and
Chalmette stipulated that Chalmette would keep its emissions under the
permit limits and report violations promptly to the court.2' At the request
of both parties, the court stayed further litigation until January 2007.22
At the conclusion of the stay, St. Bernard filed its third motion for
partial summary judgment, citing fifty new violations of the Clean Air
Act.23 Between St. Bernard's second and third motions for partial summary
judgment, however, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
LDEQ agreed to consent decrees with Chalmette. 4 Federal and state
governments have some concurrent authority in attaining the goals of the
CAA.2 ' The EPA is charged with enforcing the CAA and developing
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS").26 State agencies like
LDEQ fit into the national scheme by creating a plan to ensure that state
ambient air reaches those standards. 7 Citing its consent decrees with the
EPA and LDEQ, Chalmette moved for summary judgment claiming that res
judicata and collateral estoppel bar St. Bernard's new and any future
claims. 8
B. The Consent Decrees
St. Bernard cited fifty violations in its third motion for summary
judgment including the release of 29,304 pounds of sulfur dioxide and
33,832 pounds of "volatile organic compounds." 29 Chalmette conceded to
the violations but claimed that it was not liable to St. Bernard because the
consent decree between Chalmette, the EPA, and the LDEQ covered all of
18 Id.
19Id.20 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 399 F. Supp. 2d
726, 737 (E.D. La. 2005).21 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d





25 See id at 597.
26 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 597 (E.D. La. 2007).27 
Id.
21 Id. at 596.
29 Id. at 598-99.
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the violations.3 ° If the court accepted Chalmette's view, then the plaintiffs
action would be barred by res judicata.3' St. Bernard knew of the decree
prior to its third motion.32 It had met with the EPA before the EPA drafted
the consent decree and submitted comments on the decree to the EPA, the
LDEQ, Chalmette and the court.33 Although the EPA reviewed all of these
materials from St. Bernard, it chose not to revise the consent decree.34
Among other things, the EPA consent decree required Chalmette to
comply with the New Source Performance Standards, apply for Title V
permits, reduce discharges of gases and particulate matter, and comply with
federal regulations governing benzene emissions. 35  These requirements
functioned essentially as injunctive relief against future pollution and
violations of the CAA. The consent decree also included monetary
provisions such as mandatory payments to various environmental projects
and penalty amounts for future violations.36 Chalmette made a settlement
with the LDEQ that essentially mirrored the EPA consent decree, adding
only that Chalmette donate equipment valued at $800,000 to the LDEQ.37
In response to St. Bernard's motion for summary judgment,
Chalmette argued that these extremely comprehensive agreements "cover
all incidents and alleged [Clean Air Act] violations that form the basis of
Plaintiffs' claims" and moved for summary judgment.38 St. Bernard
countered that Chalmette had not complied with the agreements and
produced evidence of ten post-consent decree violations.39  These
arguments presented the following issues to the District Court: 1) do res
judicata and collateral estoppel apply to citizen suits under the Clean Air
Act, and 2) if so, had Chalmette demonstrated the elements in this case? 40
C. Resjudicata: Parens Patriae and Privity
St. Bernard claimed that res judicata did not apply to citizen suits
under the CAA because the statutory text does not preclude citizen suits
and that the mootness doctrine did not apply under these particular
circumstances, because relief from those doctrines were the only ways to
30 Id. at 599-600.
3 id.
32 See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d





37 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 601 (E.D. La. 2007).38 id.
39 id.
40 See id.
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bar citizen-suits under the CAA. 4 ' The court agreed that the CAA does not
have a statutory preclusion bar to citizen suits. 42 Furthermore, although
"citizen suits to require compliance are rendered moot only after a showing
that it was absolutely clear that violations 'could not reasonably be
expected to recur,""'3 the district court found four circuits that applied res
judicata in CAA cases regardless of the mootness issue. 44 The court held
that the common law doctrine of res judicata applies to citizen-suit cases
under the CAA.45
The rule of res judicata covers the preclusive doctrines of both res
judicata and collateral estoppel.46 Here, the court found it unnecessary to
examine collateral estoppel in light of its res judicata holding.47 To use res
judicata, a party must demonstrate four elements:
(1) [T]he parties are identical or in privity; (2) the
judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded
by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim
or cause of action was involved in both actions.48
Through the first element, parens patriae made its debut in Fifth Circuit
environmental law. Chalmette argued that the doctrine of parens patriae
created privity between St. Bernard and the EPA.49
Parens patriae provides a state with the standing to sue on behalf
of its citizens.50 It literally means "parent of the country.' Parens patriae
comes from the "royal prerogative," an English common law doctrine that
allowed the state to take care of a person who could not care of himself or
his property due to a mental defect.52 The American doctrine of parens
patriae has evolved beyond these roots. Now its application requires the
state to assert a quasi-sovereign interest apart from the interests of private
4' See id. at 601-02.
42 See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 602 (E.D. La. 2007).
43 Id at 602 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
193 (2000)).
4id.
41 See id. at 603.
46 Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005).
47 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 608 (E.D. La. 2007).
481 d. at 603.49 Id.
50 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
51 Afred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979)).
52 Id. (citations omitted).
2008-2009]
Ky. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
parties.53 Sovereign interests traditionally arise when the state exercises
power over individuals within the state and gains recognition as a sovereign
by other sovereigns.54 These interests include the "interests that the State
has in the well-being of its populace." 55
To assert parens patriae the state must express a quasi-sovereign
interest that is not merely nominal.5 6 States have quasi-sovereign interests
in "the health and well-being-both physical and economic--of its
residents in general.",17  This makes parens patriae well-suited for
application in environmental law, as harm to the environment can clearly
affect the general well-being of the State's citizens. There is no clear,
systematic set of rules for the doctrine's application, 58 but the Supreme
Court has given guidelines as to when it applies:
[a]lthough more must be alleged than injury to an
identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect
effects of the injury must be considered as well as in
determining whether the State has alleged injury to a
sufficiently substantial segment of its population. One
helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury
to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the
State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury
is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to
address through its sovereign lawmaking powers. 59
The emphasized text bears directly on Chalmette's argument, as the State
has addressed the injury in this case through enacting the CAA. Parens
patriae creates privity between the individual whose interest the State is
representing and "an official or agency invested by law with the authority
to represent the person's interests."60  The individual is not bound in
privity, however, if the representing party does not act for the individual
with "due diligence and reasonable prudence."6' Generally courts presume
53 Id. at 607.
54 See id. at 601.
" Id. at 602.
56 Afred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 Id. (emphasis added).
60 See Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743,
758-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(d) (1982)).
61 Id. at 759 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(1)(e) (1982)).
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diligence,62 and the district court based its examination of preclusion
standards on the strength of this presumption.63
The court noted that a consent decree between a defendant and the
state representing its citizens through parens patriae binds those citizens'
rights because they are "privies for resjudicata purposes. '"64 After deciding
that there could be privity through parens patriae, the court had to
determine when a consent decree precludes a citizen suit.65 A survey of
neighboring circuits identified three different standards courts use to
determine the relationship between consent decrees and res judicata.66
D. Options for the Court: When does Parens Patriae Apply and Cause
Preclusion?
This issue was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit; therefore
the district court looked to standards developed in other circuits. 67  The
Eighth, Seventh, and Second Circuits had established standards for
determining when a consent decree would bar an action.68 Those courts
had used the standards in relation to the Clean Water Act (CWA),69 but
these standards were still relevant to the district court's ultimate
determination.7°
The Eighth Circuit held that the mere existence of a consent decree
between a state or federal government and the defendant bars the plaintiff's
action.7' This standard ignores the effectiveness or potential effectiveness
of the consent decree in bringing an end to the statutory violation.72 The
Eighth Circuit reasoned that the EPA "is charged with enforcing the CWA
on behalf of all citizens," and once the EPA acts, there is nothing left for
the private citizen to do.73 This standard allows for frequent findings of res
judicata as it bars the plaintiffs claim whenever the State has acted. The
Eighth Circuit standard relies on a presumption of state diligence because
62 Id. at 760.
63 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 603-06 (E.D. La. 2007).




61 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 604 (E.D. La. 2007).
"Id. at 604-05.
69 Id.
" Id. at 605.71 Id. at 604.
7 See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 604 (E.D. La. 2007).
73 Id. (quoting United States Envtl. Prot. Agency v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d
1394, 1404 (86h Cir. 1990).
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of the "preeminent role" that the state agency has in enforcing statutory
violations.74
The Second Circuit test is at the oposite end of the spectrum,
making findings of res judicata infrequent. '7 This standard states that
preclusion occurs when the basis for the citizen suit no longer exists.76 This
arises when the consent decree or other government action has actually
stopped the violations of the statute "without any likelihood of
recurrence." 77 The Second Circuit court held that, despite the existence of a
consent decree, res judicata did not bar a suit where it seemed likely that a
defendant would continue to violate the CWA.78 While appropriate where
there is evidence that the state has failed, this view is the exact opposite of
the general presumption of state diligence, decreasing its precedential value
to the St. Bernard court.
The Seventh Circuit's standard, the diligent prosecution test,
provides a middle ground.79 Based on CWA language, this approach
focuses on the consent decree's ability to require the defendant's
compliance rather than the existence of actual compliance. 80 The diligent
prosecution standard takes more than "mere acceptance at face value of the
potentially self-serving statements" of the State and the defendant and
instead looks at "whether [the consent decree] is capable of requiring
compliance with the [Act] and is in good faith calculated to do so.' '81 The
State does not need "perfect foresight" but must make a diligent attempt at
ceasing the violations.82 This standard recognizes the presumption of state
diligence but reduces the weight of the presumption by finding that blind
acceptance of a consent decree is not enough.83
E. The Court's Holding: Diligent Prosecution is the Best Standard
The St. Bernard court analyzed the three possible tests and adopted
the diligent prosecution standard.84 The court found that this approach
struck "a reasonable balance" between the Eighth Circuit's lenient test and
74 Id. (quoting Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1404).
71 See id. at 605.
76 Id. (quoting Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127
(2d Cir. 1991)).
77 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 605 (E.D. La. 2007) (quoting Atlantic States, 933 F.2d at 127).
m See id. (citing Atlantic States, 933 F.2d at 128).
79 See id. at 604 (citing Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist.,
382 F.3d 743, 759 (7' Cir. 2004)).
go See id. (citing Milwaukee's Rivers, 382 F.3d at 759).
8' St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 604 (E.D. La. 2007) (citing Milwaukee's Rivers, 382 F.3d at 759-760).
82 Id. at 604-605 (citing Milwaukee's Rivers, 382 F.3d at 759).
83 See id. at 604 (citing Milwaukee's Rivers, 382 F.3d at 760).
84 Id. at 604-06.
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the Second Circuit's stricter "elimination of all violations" test.85  In
addition, the court concluded that the Seventh Circuit test was more true to
the purpose of a citizen suit provision because it allows a pre-government
action citizen suit to remain effective where the government's action may
not force a defendant's compliance. 6 Applying the standard, the district
court held that the consent decree constituted a diligent prosecution because
it contained provisions that dealt directly with the defendant's violations
and could require compliance. 7 St. Bernard even conceded that the
consent decree would probably be effective. 8 Furthermore, evidence
showed that the consent decree already had a positive effect as the number
of Chalmette's violations decreased from thirty-seven per month before the
decree to a total of ten after the decree.
8 9
Holding that the diligently prosecuted consent decree established
privity, the St. Bernard court found that res judicata applied. 90 The facts
satisfied the four elements of res judicata, allowing the court to hold that St.
Bernard's citizen suit was precluded and making it unnecessary to consider
collateral estoppel. 9' St. Bernard did win some relief; the court granted in
part the organization's motion for partial summary judgment because the
consent decree did not cover two incidents in the plaintiff's complaint.92
The district court found Chalmette liable for these violations.93
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOLDING
A. St. Bernard Potentially Increases the Applicability of the Diligent
Prosecution Standard
In St. Bernard, the district court adopted the Seventh Circuit's
diligent prosecution standard that found its basis in language of the CWA.94
The relevant CWA provisions provide that a citizen suit may not be
brought when the state "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require
" Id. at 606.
86 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 606 (E.D. La. 2007).87 id.
' See id.
89 Id. at 607.
90 Id. at 608 (finding that plaintiff did not argue the courts involved did not have jurisdiction
to enter the consent decree, the consent decree is a final judgment on the merits, and that plaintiffs did
not argue that the consent decree covered a cause of action distinct from their own).
9' St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 608 (E.D. La. 2007).92 1d. at 610.
93 id.
94 Id. at 605-06.
2008-2009]
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order .. , When reading
St. Bernard, one does not find this language.96
The court's omission of this language does not mean that the court
did not or could not rely on it. The CAA provision provides an additional
reason to adopt the diligent prosecution standard.97 As this language
further justifies adopting the CWA-based approach, it is unclear why the
court did not explicitly cite this language.
The court's adoption of the diligent prosecution standard implies
that the diligent prosecution standard should be applied wherever this
language exists. This has the potential for making the test widely
applicable. The statutory language "diligently prosecuting a civil action"
also appears in citizen suit provisions of United States Code titles covering
toxic substances control,98 national forests,99 mining, l°° and noise control, 10
to name a few. If it makes sense to use the standard with the CAA, there is
no reason why the test cannot apply in actions based on these statutes. The
district court's adoption of this standard strongly suggests that the standard
should function under these statutes.
B. Parens Patriae Allows the State to Intercede Even After Plaintiff
has Commenced Suit
St. Bernard does not affect the ability of the government to address
violations of environmental law in the face of citizen suits. In each case the
St. Bernard court cited as creating a preclusion standard, the State became
involved after the filing of a citizen suit.10 2 Citizen suit provisions should
not be read to discourage governments from entering into consent decrees
regarding the same subject matter of the citizen suit plaintiffs complaint. 10 3
The Second Circuit stated that allowing citizen suits to preclude
government action could result in "underenforcement" of the statute, as a
citizen suit's purpose is to catch violations not prosecuted by the State. 1°4
Underenforcement could result because citizen suits address legal interests
that are narrower than those of the State. Citizen suits "may neither be
9' 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2008).
96 See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592 (E.D. La. 2007).
97 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2008).
98 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619(b)(I)(B) (2008).
" 16 U.S.C.A. § 544m(bX3)(A)(ii) (2008).
'0o 30 U.S.C.A § 1270(bX)(B) (2008).
1' 42 U.S.C.A §4911(bX)(B) (2008).
102 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 604-06 (E.D. La. 2007) (citations omitted).
103 Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir.
1991). 104 id.
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addressed wholly to past violations nor seek to recover fines and penalties
that the government has elected to forego.' 10 5  A citizen suit must
"supplement, not supplant" state enforcement. 10 6  St. Bernard does not
change the status quo.
C. Continued Violations by the Defendant after the Consent Decree
The diligent prosecution standard is an effective preclusion test
because it does not allow the violator any easy outs, as the Eighth Circuit
test might. If a decree has no teeth it does not qualify as a diligent
prosecution. The Seventh Circuit addressed concerns about post-consent
decree violations, stating that "[i]f the State fails to diligently prosecute
post-[consent decree] violations, [private actors] may prod it into action."',0 7
This "prodding" occurs when the private actor files notice of intent to bring
a citizen suit.'0 8 Even if the private action fails to motivate state action, the
violator still must face the subsequent citizen suit,1°9 as long as the private
plaintiff does not seek damages the State has chosen to forego."' The
diligent prosecution standard does not let the violator escape liability, and it
ensures compliance with the statute through a consent decree or citizen suit
litigation.
D. The Effect of Parens Patriae on a Plaintiff's Remedy
The district court's finding of res judicata precluded St. Bernard
from pursuing a remedy for the majority of its allegations."' Plaintiffs
were permitted to move forward, however, on two claims of CAA
violations which were not covered by the Consent Decree." 2 Any civil
penalties won by St. Bernard will be "deposited in a special fund in the
United States Treasury." ' 1 3 The damage amounts deposited in the Treasury
Department fund are used to "finance air compliance and enforcement
activities."' 14 This furthers the purpose of the CAA by working to prevent
harmful emissions.
'05 Id. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-
61(1987)).
,o6 Id. (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-60).
107 Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 763
(7th Cir. 2004).
108 See id. at 748, 763.
109 See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtil. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp.
2d 592, 610 (E.D. La. 2007).
110 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir.
1991) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987)).
St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
2 Id. at 610.
,5 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(g)(1) (2008).
114 42. U.S.C.A. § 7604(g)(1) (2008).
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The court's decision did take one thing away from St. Bernard. In
its motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiff asked the court to
award attorney's fees under the CAA. 15 It is unclear from the court's
opinion whether or not St. Bernard received attorney's fees on its partially
successful motion for summary judgment. 16 Future cases involving citizen
suit provisions may address this issue. One logical reason for denying
attorney's fees is that, where the motion for summary judgment is denied
because of res judicata, there should be no award of fees because the
plaintiff did not succeed "on the merits." 117 Conversely, where the court
grants the motion in part, the plaintiff's suit remains valid under the statute
for all claims not barred by res judicata. Arguably, the plaintiff should
receive the full award the statute entitles him for those claims that are not
precluded.
III. CONCLUSION
In St. Bernard the district court established a test to determine
when government action precludes a plaintiffs citizen suit under the Clean
Air Act."l8 The court wisely chose a middle-ground approach rather than
adopting a standard that would almost always necessitate preclusion or
would allow nearly all citizen suits to progress. The diligent prosecution
standard allows a citizen suit to continue only where the government's
action is not capable of bringing about compliance with the statute and is
not designed to do so.' 19 Adoption of the diligent prosecution standard for
violations of the CAA implies that the standard should be used in other
statutes. The standard is based on language in the CAA and CWA
declaring citizen suits barred where the government is diligently
prosecuting a civil action. 120  This language appears in many other
statutes. 121 Therefore, it would seem that the diligent prosecution standard
should be applied to these cases as well.
St. Bernard did not change the preclusion game by allowing suits
that had already commenced to preclude government action. Courts
construing these statutes have found that the government is the enforcer of
them and that private suits preventing government action would lead to
115 St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d
592, 595 (E.D. La. 2007).
1l6 See id. 610.
117 See, ROBERT L. RoSSi, 1 ATTORNEYS' FEES § 10:39 (3d ed.) (2007).
"" St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 605-06.
119 Id.
120 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2008); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(i).
121 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619(b)(1)(B) (2008); 16 U.S.C.A. § 544m(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2008); 30
U.S.C.A § 1270(b)(1)(B) (2008); 42 U.S.C.A. §491 l(b)(1)(B) (2008).
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under-enforcement of the statutes. 122 The diligent prosecution standard
works well because, if there is no compliance, there is no preclusion.
Therefore, a plaintiff is free to bring suit if the consent decree fails.
122 Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir.
2008-2009]

